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General rule: sufficient interest


“It is a general rule that anyone wanting to bring an appeal must show that they have in law a sufficient interest in the matter.  The latin tag for this is “locus standi”.  There have been a number of VAT cases where locus standi has been considered and, not surprisingly, in the context of an indirect tax where the burden of the tax can fall on the taxpayer’s customer as well as the taxpayer, the Tribunal has decided in many cases that the customer does have locus standi…” (Phillips v. HMRC [2009] UKFTT 335 (TC), §105).

General rule: sufficient interest

Burden of proof 


"[44] I agree with Judge Mosedale at paragraph 90 of Mather where, albeit in regard to standing, she states:- 

“It is for a person who maintains that this Tribunal has jurisdiction to hear the appeal that must prove this Tribunal actually does have jurisdiction, and that is the case even where the jurisdiction issue is raised in an application for a strike out by the respondents”.

It is for the NHS Trusts to establish that this Tribunal does have jurisdiction." (Isle of Wight NHS trust v. HMRC [2023] UKFTT 23 (TC), Judge Anne Scott)

“I accept the normal rule for determining the burden of proof is that the person who asserts a matter must prove it. I accept also that, generally, the applicant for a strike out would have the burden of proving it was justified…Nevertheless, it seems to me that, as a tribunal can only hear cases which it has jurisdiction to hear, it must in all cases be for the person who maintains that the Tribunal has jurisdiction to prove it…I consider that it would be for Mr Mather to prove that this Tribunal does have jurisdiction, which requires him to prove he does indeed have locus standi.” (Mather v. HMRC [2014] UKFTT 1062 (TC), §69…70).

Burden of proof 

Recipients of VAT supply generally need a financial interest


“True, as I feel constrained by the plain language of the legislation to hold, only the taxpayer can make the repayment claim in the first place. Once he has done so, however, I can see no legitimate basis upon which to hold that he alone is affected by the rejection of that claim…No doubt it would be advantageous, perhaps essential, to the appellant's case that the claimant himself should co-operate in its presentation, not least with a view to defeating any defence of unjust enrichment. But that must be a matter for them; it cannot justify denying a right of appeal to those quite obviously affected by the decision.” (CEC v. Cresta Holidays Ltd [2001] EWCA Civ 215, §20).


"[91] HMRC accepted in their Applications that Judge Mosedale had found at paragraph 65 of Mather that the recipient of a supply can have sufficient interest in the VAT status of a supply to bring an appeal (Williams &Glyn’s Bank [1974] VATTR 262, Cresta Holidays Ltd [2001] EWCA Civ 215, Canterbury Hockey Club [2005] UKVAT V19086).

[92] Plainly the NHS Trusts were, and are, recipients and bore the VAT costs. Given Ms Newstead Taylor’s concession for the purposes of this hearing only that the financial interest had been established, in my view that suffices to establish that the Category 1 and 2 appellants do have standing. Whether that can be proved in due course is another matter and is not an issue for this Tribunal at this stage." (Isle of Wight NHS trust v. HMRC [2023] UKFTT 23 (TC), Judge Anne Scott)

“HMRC accepted that generally customers can have sufficient interest in the VAT status of a supply…to bring an appeal over the matter. This follows from cases such as Williams & Glyn’s Bank Ltd [1974] VATTR 262, Cresta Holidays Ltd [2001] EWCA Civ 215 and Canterbury Hockey Club [2005] UKVAT V19086.” (Mather v. HMRC [2014] UKFTT 1062 (TC), §65).


“In conclusion, the customer is not the taxpayer. Nevertheless, where a customer has a financial interest in the VAT liability of a supply made to it, the customer will have the standing to lodge an appeal against a decision of HMRC...It is certainly difficult to envisage a person having a legitimate interest in a tax case that was not financial” (Mather v. HMRC [2014] UKFTT 1062 (TC), §§77…79 - not satisfied by VAT inclusive contract where the customer had no right to recover input VAT).

Recipients of VAT supply generally need a financial interest

Recipient of VAT supply can appeal liability decision in which they were not involved


"[30] The Category 3 appellants were not clients of BB as at 30 June 2021 so HMRC’s letter was not addressed to them or indeed any of the appellants but was addressed to BB. The Category 3 appellants could have no standing to appeal a decision in which they were not involved and where HMRC knew nothing of them. 


[93] That leaves the Category 3 appellants. Ms Yang relies on the wording of section 83G(1) (a)(ii) VATA (see paragraph 40 above) which she argues makes it explicit that someone other than a taxpayer who has been notified of a decision can bring an appeal if they have standing. I agree. The wording is very clear.

[94] Ms Newstead Taylor argued that HMRC could not possibly know who might lodge an appeal and it could open a floodgate. Firstly, the Opening Letter made it clear that there would be other appellants, as indeed there have been and continue to be. Secondly, as Ms Yang pointed out Group Litigation is by no means unknown in the Tribunal.

[95]  Whether or not there is a flood of appellants is not a material consideration; the only question at this juncture is whether the Category 3 appellants can establish standing. Ex facie, an NHS Trust would not lodge an appeal unless it paid for a supply of locum doctors. Therefore, provided it could prove its financial interest, as with the other two categories of appellants, it would have standing. I therefore find that for the purposes of determining the strike-out applications all of the NHS Trusts have standing.(Isle of Wight NHS trust v. HMRC [2023] UKFTT 23 (TC), Judge Anne Scott)

Recipient of VAT supply can appeal liability decision in which they were not involved

Excise duty: person in relation to whom the decision has been made


"(2A) An appeal under this section with respect to a relevant decision shall not be entertained unless the appellant is—
(a) a person whose liability to pay any relevant duty or penalty is determined by, results from or is or will be affected by any decision to which this section applies,
(b) a person in relation to whom, or on whose application, the relevant decision has been made,
(c) a person on whom the conditions, limitations, restrictions, prohibitions or other requirements to which the relevant decision relates are or are to be imposed or applied." (FA 1994, s.16(2A))


Person not liable but interested


“I do not accept that it is clear that the appellant is not a person in relation to whom the decision was made.  While it seems to me perfectly arguable that “a person affected” covers a wider category of people than “a person in relation to whom”, even so I consider that the very close connection between the applications by Grosvenor and the interests of Woodstream makes it strongly arguable that the appellant has standing.” (Woodstream Europe Ltd v. HMRC [2017] UKFTT 657 (tC), §90, Judge Richard Thomas).

Excise duty: person in relation to whom the decision has been made

Customs duties


Only person who may appeal decision on BTI is holder


“As accepted by Liquid, Sony Supply Chain Solutions (Europe) BV is clear authority that the only person who may rely on a BTI is the “holder” of the BTI – see paragraphs 25 & 26 of Sony - and that is the person in whose name the BTI is issued (per Article 5 of the Implementing Regulation).  Where the application for the BTI is made by a representative (here, CARS) who fails to state that it is acting on behalf of another person (here, Liquid) then the applicant is deemed to be acting on its own behalf (per Article 5 of the Community Customs Code).  Thus in the current case the only person who may rely on the disputed BTI is CARS.” (Liquid Investments ltd v. HMRC [2014] UKFTT 297 (TC), §22, Judge Kempster – person affected substituted as party with appellant’s consent).

Customs duties

Partnership issues


A partner can appeal an amendment to the partnership return


“It seems to me that a proper interpretation of s 31 and one that is consistent with logic is that only the partnership returns can be appealed.  But as I said in Phillips, any partner can bring the appeal.  The effect of succeeding in the appeal would be a reduction in the partnerships' taxable profits and this would flow through to benefit all partners under s 50(9).” (Gibbs v. HMRC [2013] UKFTT 236 (TC), §56).


“In my view a partner does have a sufficient legal interest in an amendment to a partnership return under s30B as it leads automatically to an amendment to his personal tax return.  He can therefore exercise the right of appeal under s31 against assessments of the partnership or amendments to partnership returns.” (Phillips v. HMRC [2009] UKFTT 335 (TC), §106).


A partner cannot appeal the consequential amendment to his own personal return where it is consequential on a closure notice



“I agree with the conclusion of Tribunal Judge Mosedale in Gibbs. The only way to construe section 31 is that an individual partner has no right to appeal the consequential amendment of a personal return whether the amendment is under section 28B(4) or 30B(2). If an individual partner is to have an opportunity to ensure that he pays the right amount of tax it could only be through an appeal against an amendment to the partnership return.” (MCashback Software 6 LLP v. HMRC [2013] UKFTT 679 (TC), §68).


“Contrary to the view I expressed in Philips, I would agree that there is nothing in s 31(1)(b) which would permit an appeal to a consequential amendment because it only applies to 'any conclusion stated or amendment made by a closure notice under section ...28B'.  (my emphasis) While this covers the amendment to the partnership return, strictly I do not think it can be said to apply to the consequential amendments to the partners' returns because the amendment to the personal returns does not take effect by the issue of the closure notice (s 28B(2)(b)), but by issue of a separate and subsequent notice under s 28B(4).  It is an amendment but not one made by a closure notice.” (Gibbs v. HMRC [2013] UKFTT 236 (TC), §52).


A partner cannot appeal the consequential amendment to his own personal return where it is consequential on a discovery amendment


“Unlike s31(1)(b) which gives a right of appeal against any amendment made by a closure notice, s31(1)(c) only gives a right of appeal against an amendment “…of a partnership return under s30B(1)…”.  It does not give a right of appeal against consequential amendments to the partners’ returns made under s30B(2).  But this does not mean that a partner has no right of appeal:  I think any partner could appeal the amendment of the partnership return.” (Phillips v. HMRC [2009] UKFTT 335 (TC), §104).

Partnership issues



No assignment of a right to appeal a liability to pay tax


“All this leads me to conclude that a bare right to appeal is not property within the meaning of s.436 of the IA. A right of appeal available to a bankrupt is one that the bankrupt loses locus to bring or maintain once he or she is adjudicated bankrupt because the only assets out of which the underlying liability can be met have vested in the trustee and not because the right is a chose that vests in the trustee. The trustee has a statutory right (but not the obligation) to exercise any right of appeal that the bankrupt might have had as and from the moment at which the bankrupt is made the subject of a bankruptcy order. Similarly a right to appeal available to a company in liquidation can only be exercised by the office holder once appointed because he she or they then become the only agents of the company entitled to do so. Again however that is not the result of the right to appeal being treated as a property interest.” (Re GP Aviation Group International Ltd (in liquidation) [2013] EWHC 1447 (Ch), §31).


“The Court’s ruling in GP Aviation is clear and binding upon us. Given the Liquidator’s written confirmation that HMRC’s application to strike out the appeal in respect of period 03/06 is not opposed we grant the application.” (Leeds Smith Consulting Ltd v. HMRC [2016] UKFTT 449 (TC), §181).


Assignment of a right to repayment is permitted


“In my judgment, the judge was correct for the reasons he gave. As he held, [HMRC] have to show that there is some provision in the relevant statutory scheme which expressly or by implication precludes an assignment by operation of law of a claim for repayment under s 80 of VATA. Both he and this court have been referred to certain provisions of VATA and the Value Added Tax Regulations 1995, SI 1995/2518 made thereunder. There is no express legislative prohibition on assignment in the provisions to which we have been referred, and in my judgment none of them gives rise to the implication that the transfer of claims under s 80 was not permitted in the circumstances of this case…[W]here a statute refers to a person who has paid VAT, and gives him a right of repayment, the statute must in my judgment be taken, in the absence of contrary indication, to have intended to include a person in whom he has vested that right. In my judgment, the contrary indication would have to be clearly stated because the right to a repayment is a right of property which should not be restricted without clear wording. It would follow that if a person has assigned a chose in action to another so as to invest in him the right to sue for it, and to give a good receipt, HMRC could not properly pay the assignor…As I have said, it is to be presumed, unless otherwise stated, that a right which is created by statute is assignable under the general law in the same way as rights created by the general law, unless statute otherwise clearly provides.” (Midlands Co-operative Society v Revenue & Customs Commissioners [2008] EWCA Civ 305, §§2…14…18, Arden LJ).


“It was common ground that the right to make a claim for overpaid VAT pursuant to section 80 Value Added Tax Act 1994 can be the subject of an assignment or transfer (see Midlands Co-operative Society v Revenue & Customs Commissioners [2008] EWCA Civ 305).” (Challacombe’s Ltd v. HMRC [2017] UKFTT 664 (TC), §7, Judge Cannan).


“I consider a s 78 interest claim is assignable for the same reasons as a s 80 repayment claim was held to be assignable in Midlands Co-op.  See in particular Arden LJ at [18] (quoted at ¶ 19 above).” (New Miles Limited v. HMRC [2012] UKFTT 33 (TC), §24, Judge Kempster).


Method of transfer: LPA 1925, s.136


“(1) Any absolute assignment by writing under the hand of the assignor (not purporting to be by way of charge only) of any debt or other legal thing in action, of which express notice in writing has been given to the debtor, trustee or other person from whom the assignor would have been entitled to claim such debt or thing in action, is effectual in law (subject to equities having priority over the right of the assignee) to pass and transfer from the date of such notice—
(a) the legal right to such debt or thing in action;
(b) all legal and other remedies for the same; and
(c) the power to give a good discharge for the same without the concurrence of the assignor:


Provided that, if the debtor, trustee or other person liable in respect of such debt or thing in action has notice—
(a) that the assignment is disputed by the assignor or any person claiming under him; or
(b) of any other opposing or conflicting claims to such debt or thing in action;
he may, if he thinks fit, either call upon the persons making claim thereto to interplead concerning the same, or pay the debt or other thing in action into court under the provisions of the Trustee Act 1925 …” (LPA 1925, s.136).


“VATA and the regulations thereunder take effect subject to the general law unless the general law is excluded. Under the general law, the right to a repayment of monies overpaid to HMRC is a chose in action. Under the general law, choses in action are assignable under s 136 of the Law of Property Act 1925.” (Midlands Co-operative Society v Revenue & Customs Commissioners [2008] EWCA Civ 305, §9, Arden LJ).


“As stated at §§ 5 & 8 above, the document supplied to the Tribunal is missing a schedule but it is dated, executed and witnessed, and is stated to have been delivered.  As already stated, no particular challenges have been put by HMRC…The requirement in s 136 LPA 1925 to give notice to the “other person from whom the assignor would have been entitled to claim such … thing in action” was addressed by Clause 3.2 of the Deed (quoted at § 8 above) and it is apparent that HMRC are aware of the Deed.  As already stated, and held in Midlands Co-op, there is no specific statutory bar in VAT Act 1994 to assignment…For the reasons given in §§ 28 & 30 above I conclude the Deed effected an assignment of the subject matter of the Appeal.” (New Miles Limited v. HMRC [2012] UKFTT 33 (TC), §§§28…30…31, Judge Kempster).


On transfer of business


“The definition of “Assets” is all assets and rights of LBQL used or for use exclusively in connection with the business. The list of assets which follows in the definition are said to be included in those assets but on any fair reading the listed assets cannot be said to be exhaustive (cp Crystal Palace FC (2000) Limited where the list of assets sold was held to be exhaustive). Clause 8 of the agreement supports that conclusion. As Mr Sellers said, it is a “catch all” provision so that any assets not specifically identified were intended to be transferred to the purchaser.” (Challacombe’s Ltd v. HMRC [2017] UKFTT 664 (TC), §52, Judge Cannan).


Liquidation: assignment may be void


“In my view it would have been perfectly possible for the Respondents to have made its application for a strike out on that basis, relying on the fact that the timing of the purported assignment meant that it was void under section 127 Insolvency Act 25 1986 and if the Liquidator had indicated at that time that he did not wish to adopt the appeal, it must have been highly likely that the appeal would have been struck out on that basis.” (Clear Plc v. Director of Border Revenue PTA/88/2011, §53, Judge Herrington).



Grant of right to conduct appeal is valid

“It does not seem to me that such jurisdiction is affected by:
(1)          the appointment of the liquidator. The liquidator brings the appeal as an agent of the company;
(2)          any appointment by the liquidator of someone to conduct the litigation. It remains an appeal by the company, and in appeal over which the tribunal has jurisdiction
(3)          any ceding of power over the appeal as the result of the Deed. The appeal remains an appeal brought by the company…I do not believe that the granting of the conduct of appeal to the Directors (whether in the form of the Deed or otherwise) is an abuse of the process of this tribunal. There is a serious dispute over a large amount of VAT. The Directors are likely to be the persons best able to give evidence of the transactions and the persons most interested in the determination of the appeal. The only forum in which that VAT liability may be determined is this tribunal. The making of that determination is the use, rather than the abuse, of the tribunal's process.” (Space Maker Storage 2 Ltd v. HMRC [2014] UKFTT 296 (TC), §20, Judge Hellier).

Grant of right to conduct appeal is valid



General rule: only the trustee in bankruptcy has standing


“The Crown wants [these appeals] dismissed, and submits that they should be dismissed for this very short reason, that Mr. Soul, having been adjudicated bankrupt, now has no interest left in the matter at all - that it has passed to his trustee in bankruptcy. And his trustee tells us that, having considered the appeals, he does not think they are worth pursuing; he is now unwilling to be a party to the appeals, or to prosecute them. In those circumstances I think that the Court is left with no option but to dismiss the appeals, because Mr. Soul has now no interest in the matter at all, having been adjudicated bankrupt.” (Soul v. IRC 43 TC 662 (1966), Harman LJ)


“The assessments under appeal are all assessments for income tax and national insurance contributions. As such, they are governed by the general rules that a bankrupt cannot in his own name appeal from a judgment against him which is enforceable only against the estate vested in the trustee.” (Ahajot v. Waller [2004] STC (SCD) 151, §34 – appeal dismissed; reasoning approved in R (oao Singh) v. HMRC [2012] UKUT 174 (TCC), §28).


“The only persons with any legal interest in pursuing the appeals against them are therefore the trustees in bankruptcy.  The trustees in bankruptcy have stated that they have not and do not consent to Mr Jones acting for them, they do not intend to pursue the appeal, and they agree to it being stuck out…In these circumstances, the appeal must be struck out as there is no jurisdiction as there is no one with any proper interest in the appeal who wishes to pursue it.” (Jones v. HMRC [2017] UKFTT 567 (TC), §§19…20, Judge Mosedale)


 “In the light of these cases, and in particular the Soul cases, McNulty and Ahajot, the first two of which are binding on us while the third is highly persuasive, we hold that the appellant, as an undischarged bankrupt, had no standing to bring his appeals against assessments to the Tribunal.  Nor in the light of McNulty did he have standing to bring appeals against penalties to us.  As to the application to notify the Tribunal late, Singh suggests strongly that, since an application to bring judicial review proceedings is not one for which an undischarged bankrupt has standing, an application to notify appeals late should be treated is an identical way.” (Ali v. HMRC [2015] UKFTT 464 (TC), §28 – appeal struck out).


Even after discharge


“The first and main reason is that it is clear from both the provisions of the Insolvency Act 1986 (the “IA”) and a number of cases that were drawn to my attention by the Respondents that, as a person who has been the subject of a bankruptcy order, the Appellant has no standing to pursue any appeal against the Respondents.  Instead, that is solely a matter for her trustee in bankruptcy.  This is the case even though the Appellant has now been discharged from the bankruptcy.” (Harrold v. HMRC [2018] UKFTT 117 (TC), §6, Judge Beare).


The general rule applies even in respect of the decision upon which the bankruptcy petition is founded

“It was suggested that the position was different in the case of a judgment upon which the bankruptcy petition was founded. It was suggested that the position was different because the bankrupt does have an interest because if he can get rid of the judgment, he may be able to have the bankruptcy order annulled. Hoffmann LJ [in Heath v. Tang [1993] 1 WLR 1421] rejected this argument saying that there was “nothing sufficiently special about the petitioner’s judgment to take it out of the general principle”.” (R (oao Singh) v. HMRC [2012] UKUT 174 (TCC), §23).

Explicit permission from trustee required


“It is not enough that the trustees in bankruptcy took no steps to object to his pursuing the appeal.  The only persons who could pursue the appeal are the trustees in bankruptcy so the only way Mr Jones could pursue the appeal would be if the trustees actively permitted him to pursue it on their behalf.” (Jones v. HMRC [2017] UKFTT 567 (TC), §§19…20, Judge Mosedale)


Possible exception: assessments raised after the date of bankruptcy


“I ought to refer to the decision of HH Judge Purle QC in Arnold v Williams [2008] BPIR 247. That was a case where the bankrupt had been discharged from his bankruptcy. HMRC had raised assessment during the bankruptcy in respect of pre-bankruptcy tax in respect of which they submitted a proof of debt. The assessments (in the name of the bankrupt) were not served on the bankrupt but only on the trustee. The bankrupt later sought to appeal the assessments, but HMRC declined to entertain the appeal on the basis that the right of appeal was the sole responsibility of the trustee. The trustee admitted the proof in full. The bankrupt, in accordance with the appropriate bankruptcy procedure, then made an application to the bankruptcy court to reverse that decision. A further assessment was made in respect of pre-bankruptcy taxi, this time in the name of the trustee… The judge distinguished the reasoning in Heath v Tang which, according to him, could have no application in the case before him where the assessments post-dated the bankruptcy. The right to appeal the assessment did not therefore vest in the trustee and there was no statutory basis for allowing him to appeal just because the bankruptcy estate is interested…I have considerable difficulty with that analysis. The reasoning of Heath v Tang is not that the right to appeal vests in the trustee (although it does so where the assessment pre-dates the bankruptcy). Rather, the bankrupt has no standing to proceed with the appeal because he has no interest in the estate which has vested in the trustee and which comprises the only assets out of which the tax could be paid. If the bankrupt has no standing then the trustee must have standing otherwise the unacceptable result would be reached under which no-one had a right of appeal at all.” (R (oao Singh) v. HMRC [2012] UKUT 174 (TCC), §§33 – 35).

Possible exception: staying appeal pending application to annul bankruptcy


“On his behalf she points out that an appeal against the refusal to annul the bankruptcy order may yet succeed; and that if it does, the effect will be that Mr Foenander will have been, throughout, a person entitled to pursue the appeal for which this court has already given permission. Accordingly, she submits, the opportunity for Mr Foenander to pursue this appeal should be preserved by adjourning the appeal until the question whether or not the bankruptcy order should be annulled has been finally determined; that is to say, first determined by the High Court on appeal from the Registrar, and then perhaps, on any further application for permission to appeal or appeal, by this court. That may be some way in the future. There is obvious force in her submission that the court should not dismiss the appeal, on the basis that Mr Foenander has no standing to pursue it, while there remains a possibility that he will regain such standing…In those circumstances, it has seemed to us that, in deciding whether or not to grant an adjournment if this appeal, we should consider and form a view as to the potential for success of the appeal.” (Boyd & Hutchinson (A Firm) v Foenander [2003] EWCA Civ 1516, §§8…10 – on the facts, the appeal had no merit so no adjournment was granted).

A bankrupt does not have a personal interest in appealing a penalty


“Thus I agree with [the Revenue] that a penalty under the 1970 Act is provable in the bankruptcy with the result that the appellant has already been released from any such debts by his discharge. That means that the appellant does not have any personal interest in the appeals before the Special Commissioners and so the exception in Heath v Tang cannot apply to him.” (Ahajot v. Waller [2004] STC (SCD) 151, §34).


Although the point was left open in another case:


“Counsel for the Appellant argued that it was not necessary for him to appeal the surcharges and that his liability to tax should be considered “as a whole”. I do not accept that argument: the tax assessment and the surcharges are distinct liabilities subject to distinct rights of appeal. It is therefore not necessary for me to consider whether the surcharges are “criminal offences”, or, if they are, whether the second and third steps in the argument are well founded.” (McNulty v. HMRC [2012] UKUT 174 (TCC), §37).


The bankrupt may apply for a court order that the trustee pursue the appeal

“The rule that the bankrupt could not sue on a cause of action vested in his trustee was enforced with such rigour that he could not even bring proceedings claiming that the intended defendant and the trustee were colluding to stifle a claim due to the estate and which, if recovered, would produce a surplus. But in any case in which he was aggrieved by the trustee's refusal to prosecute a claim he could apply to the judge having jurisdiction in bankruptcy to direct the trustee to bring an action, or to allow the bankrupt to conduct the proceedings in the name of the trustee. The jurisdiction of the bankruptcy judge to give such directions is now conferred by statute [Insolvency Act 10986 s.303(1)].” (Heath v. Tang [1993] 1 WLR 1421)


Or should challenge the statutory demand/petition


“A person against whom a bankruptcy petition is laid can object to it on the basis (if true) that he is appealing the debt; and the bankruptcy court may stay the petition pending the appeal, although they presumably would only do so if satisfied the appeal against the debt had a reasonable prospect of success. Even if the bankrupt fails to successfully challenge the petition, the bankrupt may also apply to have the bankruptcy annulled.” (Jones v. HMRC [2017] UKFTT 567 (TC), §25, Judge Mosedale)


Non-existence of a party 

FTT cannot hear a case if one party does not exist


Tribunal cannot hear a case in which one of the parties no longer exists, e.g. because it has been liquidated (Wimpole Interiors Ltd TC03553).


Restoration to register has retrospective effect


“The appellant was not restored to the register of companies until 5 December 2011. I accept the appellant’s submission that the effect of the order of the court made in respect of the restoration is that the appellant is deemed to have continued in existence as if it had not been dissolved with the effect that the notice of appeal can now be treated as valid notwithstanding the fact that it was made at a time when the company was not in existence.” (Hattons (Southport) Ltd v. HMRC [2016] UKFTT 710 (TC), §8).

Non-existence of a party 

Member of former LLP had standing to appeal VAT questions relating to LLP


"[132] The Tribunal considered that it had jurisdiction in terms of section 83 of VATA, subject to Sections 83G and 84. BB stated that in terms of section 84 (4) (a) the right of appeal is open to ‘any person’ and is not limited to the person that is assessed or has been refused credit." (Binfield v. HMRC [2022] UKFTT 364 (TC), Judge Gemmell)

Member of former LLP had standing to appeal VAT questions relating to LLP
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