© 2025 by Michael Firth KC, Gray's Inn Tax Chambers
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N2-3. Deeming provisions
Identifying deeming provisions
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- Inclusive definition used to enlarge or clarify ordinary meaning
“[34]...v) Parliament sometimes employs what are termed in Bennion, Bailey and Norbury on Statutory Interpretation (8th ed.) "inclusive definitions". Bennion, Bailey and Norbury on Statutory Interpretation explains in section 18.3 that an "inclusive definition" "modifies the natural meaning of the defined term by enlarging it or clarifying potential doubt about what is covered", "typically takes the form 'X includes'" and "is used to enlarge the meaning of the defined term to cover things that are not or might not otherwise be caught" so that "[t]he term as used in the Act has its natural meaning (which is left undefined) and in addition has the special meaning given to it by the inclusive definition". Such definitions, Bennion, Bailey and Norbury on Statutory Interpretation states, "are often adopted where the core meaning of a term is sufficiently clear to mean that it does not need definition but there is some doubt around the edges"." (HMRC v. Innovative Bites Limited [2025] EWCA Civ 293, Newey, Males, Nugee LJJ)
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- Deeming provision is not a technical term: look at substance
"[37] The Upper Tribunal concluded that Note (5) is not a "deeming provision" but an "inclusive definition". Whether or not Note (5) is appropriately labelled a "deeming provision" is not in the end important, however. "Deeming provision" is not a technical term with a precise meaning. What matters is what Parliament has said about the significance of Note (5), and, to my mind, it has stated unambiguously that products of the types described in Note (5) are "confectionery" for the purposes of Item 2." (HMRC v. Innovative Bites Limited [2025] EWCA Civ 293, Newey, Males, Nugee LJJ)
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- Definition would not achieve purpose if it amounted to a rebuttable presumption
"[40] I see the force of those observations. The FTT was not, however, suggesting that products such as are described in Note (5) are not necessarily to be regarded as "confectionery" for the purposes of Item 2. To the contrary, it saw the purpose of Note (5) as "clarify[ing] the meaning of 'confectionery' and … provid[ing] certainty where there might be some doubt about whether an item should be classified as confectionery". Note (5) would not achieve that objective if, as the Upper Tribunal considered to be the position, it were merely "akin to a rebuttable presumption" and "other factors might lead to a conclusion that the product is not confectionery".
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[42] With respect, I am not sure how Note (5) would operate on the basis of the Upper Tribunal's understanding of it. The Upper Tribunal spoke of the point of Note (5) being that "it saves time having to agonise over whether a product of that description falls within the meaning of confectionery". Were there, though, the potential for "other factors" to "lead to a conclusion that the product is not confectionery", Note (5) would not seem to have removed the need to "agonise" over whether a product is "confectionery". Further, I do not know what, if any, weight the Upper Tribunal thought should be attached to the fact that a product fell within Note (5). The Upper Tribunal referred to "the presumption that a product thus defined" was "confectionery" being "outweigh[ed]". I am not clear whether that meant that inclusion in Note (5) was considered to carry weight of itself or whether the Upper Tribunal saw such inclusion as merely providing a starting point." (HMRC v. Innovative Bites Limited [2025] EWCA Civ 293, Newey, Males, Nugee LJJ)
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- Subject to absurdity
"[44] That said, I agree with [HMRC] that, having regard to the principles mentioned in paragraph 34(iii) and (iv) above, a product which can be said to fall within Note (5) if read literally will nevertheless not be "confectionery" for the purposes of Item 2 if that would be absurd or it is obvious that, in the light of their purpose, the provisions were not intended to apply to the product. "Cooked sweet chilli flavoured chicken skewers" would be excluded on this basis.
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[46] In short, I agree with Mr Watkinson that, absent absurdity or the like, Note (5) is conclusive. If, accordingly, a product is "sweetened prepared food which is normally eaten with the fingers", it is "confectionery" for the purposes of Item 2. The Upper Tribunal was mistaken in thinking that Note (5) is just "akin to a presumption" and that "other factors might lead to a conclusion that the product is not confectionery". The "words which Parliament has chosen to enact as an expression of the purpose of the legislation" signify that products such as are described in Note (5) are "confectionery"." (HMRC v. Innovative Bites Limited [2025] EWCA Civ 293, Newey, Males, Nugee LJJ)
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General principles​
"[27] There are useful but not conclusive dicta in reported authorities about the way in which, in general, statutory deeming provisions ought to be interpreted and applied. They are not conclusive because they may fairly be said to point in different directions, even if not actually contradictory. The relevant dicta are mainly collected in a summary by Lord Walker in DCC Holdings (UK) Ltd v Revenue and Customs Comrs [2011] 1 WLR 44, paras 37-39, collected from Inland Revenue Comrs v Metrolands (Property Finance) Ltd [1981] 1 WLR 637, Marshall v Kerr [1995] 1 AC 148; 67 TC 56 and Jenks v Dickinson [1997] STC 853. They include the following guidance, which has remained consistent over many years:
(1) The extent of the fiction created by a deeming provision is primarily a matter of construction of the statute in which it appears.
(2) For that purpose the court should ascertain, if it can, the purposes for which and the persons between whom the statutory fiction is to be resorted to, and then apply the deeming provision that far, but not where it would produce effects clearly outside those purposes.
(3) But those purposes may be difficult to ascertain, and Parliament may not find it easy to prescribe with precision the intended limits of the artificial assumption which the deeming provision requires to be made.
(4) A deeming provision should not be applied so far as to produce unjust, absurd or anomalous results, unless the court is compelled to do so by clear language.
(5) But the court should not shrink from applying the fiction created by the deeming provision to the consequences which would inevitably flow from the fiction being real. As Lord Asquith memorably put it in East End Dwellings Co Ltd v Finsbury Borough Council [1952] AC 109, at 133:
“The statute says that you must imagine a certain state of affairs; it does not say that having done so, you must cause or permit your imagination to boggle when it comes to the inevitable corollaries of that state of affairs.” (Fowler v. HMRC [2020] UKSC 22, Lord Briggs)
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Context may limit the scope of a deeming provision
"[40] The true position, I think, is that the successor is no more to be taken to have obtained ownership than the predecessor is to be assumed to have had it in the first place. The role of section 78(1) is to explain how property should be valued where it has passed from the predecessor to the successor without a sale. It is not to deem property to have passed or, more specifically, to deem the predecessor to have had ownership or the successor to have achieved it. The provision does not state that property is to be deemed to belong to the successor, and no such inference can be drawn from property's being treated "as if … it had been sold". Section 78(1) has a valuation function. It says nothing about whether section 24(1)(b) is satisfied.
[41] I am reinforced in that view by section 78's failure to deal with matters which it might have been expected to address if the effect of that provision had been to deem ownership to transfer to the successor...
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[44] Doubtless, the legislation could be read in the way [the taxpayer] suggested if section 78(1) were understood to deem machinery and plant to belong to a successor. However, the fact that section 78(1) says nothing about when any deemed "belonging" is to terminate is still, I think, telling: the draftsman would, as it seems to me, be likely to have said something on the topic if section 78(1) had been intended to deem a successor to have title to property which he did not in fact own, a point to which comparison with sections 61(4) and 155(3) gives extra weight. Further, the draftsman would probably have addressed the valuation issues which could arise..." (Inmarsat Global Limited v. HMRC [2022] EWCA Civ 1076, Newey LJ)
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"[53] ... We agree with Inmarsat that deeming property to be “sold” to a person is capable of carrying with it a deeming that the property is to “belong” to that person. However, we do not consider that to be an “inevitable” consequence. The relevant question is whether, having due regard to the purpose of s78, and the statutory scheme of which it forms part, Parliament intended the deeming provision to extend as far as treating Inmarsat to be the owner of the Satellites, even though it did not actually own them.
[54] In this regard, we consider that HMRC are correct to emphasise the point that, if s78(1) were intended to establish a deemed “belonging” of plant and machinery, in the absence of a real “belonging”, it might have been expected to deal with further matters such as when the deemed belonging comes to an end and what is to happen when it does. Yet s78 does not address such points. That is in contrast with other provisions that deem machinery to belong to someone other than the real owner." (Inmarsat Global Limited v. HMRC [2021] UKUT 59 (TCC), Adam Johnson J and Judge Richards)
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“The restricted ambit of these deeming provisions is made clear both by their context and by express provision. They appear in a schedule which is concerned solely, as its heading makes clear, with the application of taper relief. The entire contents of the schedule are directed to taper relief. This would, in my view, be enough but the express terms of section 2A(7) and paragraph 1 of schedule A1 make clear the purpose and limited application of the provisions of the schedule.” (HMRC v. Stolkin [2014] UKUT 165 (TCC), §33, Richards J).
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Fiction only intended to apply for specific purpose, not generally
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"[33]...If one asks, as is required, for what purposes and between whom is the fiction created, it is plainly not for the purpose of rendering a qualifying diver immune from tax in the UK, nor adjudicating between the UK and South Africa as the potential recipient of tax. It is for the purpose of adjusting the basis of a continuing UK income tax liability which arises from the receipt of employment income. Therefore to apply the deeming provision in section 15(2) so as to alter the meaning of terms in the Treaty with the result of rendering a qualifying diver immune from UK taxation would be contrary to its purpose. It would also produce an anomalous result." (Fowler v. HMRC [2020] UKSC 22, Lord Briggs)
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"[94] The purpose of section 78(1) is to value property which has passed from a predecessor to a successor without a sale (see paragraph 40 above). The mechanism to achieve that valuation is an assumed (but fictitious) sale of that property at open market value by the predecessor to the successor. The central error in Inmarsat's case lies in seeking to press that statutory fiction further, to deem ownership of the property to have passed to the successor. That is not what section 78(1) provides and is not what the statutory fiction created by section 78(1) was intended to do; nor is it an inevitable corollary of that statutory fiction. Inmarsat's case offends the principles summarised in Fowler, set out at paragraph 36 above." (Inmarsat Global Limited v. HMRC [2022] EWCA Civ 1076, Whipple LJ)
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Fiction only applying for the purpose of a particular section (not whole Act)
"The taxpayer's principal argument was that s 24(11) requires the court to assume that the provisions of the arrangement dated 31 January 1978 had been contained in the will of the testator who died on 27 February 1977. But s 24(11) only requires that 'this section shall apply as if' the provisions of the arrangement had been contained in the will. As I have indicated, s 24 deals with the consequences of death and nothing else. The arrangement constituted a settlement under which Mrs Kerr was the settlor because she alone could constitute the trust fund and dictate the terms of the arrangement. There is nothing in s 24 which requires s 80 of the 1981 Act to be applied as if Mrs Kerr had not constituted the trust fund or dictated the terms of the arrangement." (Marshall v. Kerr [1994] STC 638 a 642)
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Frequently difficult to prescribe the full extent of the deeming
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"[44] Moreover, in deciding the scope of a deeming provision, it is important to bear in mind the obvious difficulties that Parliament has in prescribing the full extent of that deeming. As Neuberger J, as he then was, said in Jenks v Dickinson (Inspector of Taxes) [1997] STC 853 at 878:
"…[By] its very nature, a deeming provision involves artificial assumptions. It will frequently be difficult or unrealistic to expect the legislature to be able satisfactorily to [prescribe] the precise limit to the circumstances in which, or the extent to which, the artificial assumptions are to be made."" (Inmarsat Global Limited v. HMRC [2021] UKUT 59 (TCC), Adam Johnson J and Judge Richards)
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Do not depart from the real world further than the hypothesis compels
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"I accept [HMRC's] arguments, which require one first to identify what was the property settled by the arrangement and then to ask the question, 'Is there anything in s 24 which requires one to assume a state of facts inconsistent with Mrs Kerr having been the settlor of the property so identified?
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...consequence (2) does not require one to assume (contrary to the true facts) that Mrs Kerr did not 'dispose' of any property when she executed the arrangement but only that such disposition did not give rise to a chargeable event.'" (Marshall v. Kerr [1994] STC 638 a 649 and 651, Lord Browne-Wilkinson)
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"[45] Finally in this regard, a deeming provision necessarily involves a statutory hypothesis that is at odds with the “real world”. However, this does not mean that, when a deeming provision is engaged, the “real world” is irrelevant as the deeming provision must be applied to real world facts and circumstances. As Schiemann LJ observed in Hoare v National Trust (1998) 77 P&CR 366 in the context of the statutory “rating hypothesis” that applied in order to determine the rateable value of a non-domestic heriditament:
"The statutory hypothesis is only a mechanism for enabling one to arrive at a value for a particular hereditament for rating purposes. It does not entitle the valuer to depart from the real world further than the hypothesis compels. The Tribunal rightly accepted that in some respects it has to stay in the real world. It looked at the hereditament as it was; it took the actual assets of the actual tenant… into account."" (Inmarsat Global Limited v. HMRC [2021] UKUT 59 (TCC), Adam Johnson J and Judge Richards)
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But take as far as purpose makes it necessary
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"[46]...More controversial was the submission, contained in the skeleton argument of [the taxpayer], to the effect that it may be necessary to apply a fiction set out in a deeming provision “further than … is necessary in order to give effect to the legislative purpose”. That submission prompted [HMRC] to argue that there could never be any justification for applying a statutory fiction further than is “necessary”.
[47] We consider the difference between the parties was more apparent than real, however. We understood [the taxpayer] to be saying no more than that the ultimate task is one of purposive construction. Giving effect to that statutory purpose might result in the fiction being taken further than might, at first sight, appear justified by the words used. But one is still bound only to go as far as is necessary, and no further." (Inmarsat Global Limited v. HMRC [2021] UKUT 59 (TCC), Adam Johnson J and Judge Richards)
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"[114] HMRC have succeeded on all four Steps, and it follows that the deeming provision took effect. As Mummery LJ said when giving the only judgment in HMRC v Jones and Jones [2011] EWCA Civ 824 at [71(7)]
"...in the legal world created by legislation the deeming of a fact or of a state of affairs...is a commonly used and legitimate legislative device for spelling out a legal state of affairs consequent on the occurrence of a specified act or omission. Deeming something to be the case carries with it any fact that forms part of the conclusion."
[115] In this case, the deemed facts which form part of the conclusion are that HMRC sent the Enquiry Letter in time for it to be received in the ordinary course of post by Orega, and it was so received. The Preliminary Issue is thus decided in favour of HMRC on the basis of findings of fact, including the deemed finding on delivery." (Assembly Global Networks Limited v. HMRC [2024] UKFTT 304 (TC), Judge Redston)
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Reject a construction that leads to absurdity
"In summary, in my judgment the effect of giving the deeming provision in s 24(7) the effect contended for by the taxpayer would 'lead to injustice and absurdity' and should be rejected. The deeming provisions in s 24 do not require one to assume that the actual settlor of the arrangement was not the settlor." (Marshall v. Kerr [1994] STC 638 a 649 and 654, Lord Browne-Wilkinson)
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Deeming statutory test to be met negates any need to consider that test
"[24] It is not difficult to ascertain the purpose of the deeming provision in section 471(3). The causation questions which can arise under section 471(1) may be difficult and may give rise to disagreement among judges as has occurred in this case. To avoid such difficult questions, subsection (3) creates a bright line rule: if a person’s employer (or a person connected to that person’s employer) provides the employee the right or opportunity to acquire a securities option, that right or opportunity is conclusively treated as having been made available by reason of the employment of that person (unless subsections (a) and (b) apply). This involves a straightforward examination of the agreement or transaction to ascertain who conferred the right or opportunity. The question is not concerned with the reason why the employer conferred the right or opportunity. In this case the correct question was: did Vermilion confer the 2007 option on Mr Noble’s nominee while Mr Noble was its employee? The answer is that it did. In my view, the Lord President was correct to state that the first question to be addressed is whether section 471(3) applies, precisely because it circumvents the potentially more difficult questions of causation to which section 471(1) may give rise. What Parliament has done in enacting section 471(3) is to make clear that if an employer makes available, in this case confers by contract, a securities option, that option is treated as being an employment-related securities option." (HMRC v. Vermilion Holdings Ltd [2023] UKSC 37, Lord Hodge)​
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But see above on absurdity.
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Examples
- Treating an activity as a trade does not alter the meaning of trade
[31] So the question is whether section 15 gives a different meaning to the relevant terms. That is not how a deeming provision works generally, nor does section 15(2) in particular. Section 15(1) uses “employment” and “employment income” in exactly the same way as is prescribed by sections 4, 6 and 7 of ITEPA, and the phrase “performance of the duties of employment” in section 15(2) again uses “employment” in the same way. Section 15 is about the taxation of income arising from the performance of those duties of employment but, introduced by the word “instead”, provides that the income is to be taxed as if, contrary to the fact, it was profits of a trade.
[32] Section 15 also uses “trade” in its conventional sense and does not therefore alter the meaning of “enterprise” in article 7, it being common ground that enterprise is descriptive of a business, and that business includes trade. In short, nothing in section 15 purports to alter the settled meaning of the relevant terms of the Treaty, viewed from the perspective of UK tax law. Rather it takes the usual meaning of those terms as its starting point, and erects a fiction which, applying those terms in their usual meaning, leads to a different way of recovering income tax from qualifying divers." (Fowler v. HMRC [2020] UKSC 22, Lord Briggs)
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- Deeming property to be immovable property also means applying the situs rules for immovable property
"[49] I accept [HMRC's] submission that there is no such difficulty created by Article 6. By deeming the rights described in Article 6(2) to be immovable property, the Article also deems those rights to be located in the State where the immovable property is located. I did not understand Mr Peacock KC, appearing for RBC, to challenge that conclusion. If the rights are sufficiently closely connected with the land to be treated as immovable property themselves then they are sufficiently closely connected with the land to be treated as located where the land is located." (HMRC v. Royal Bank of Canada [2025] UKSC 2)​
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- Deeming a sale at open market value does not deem successor to own something it did not own
"[40] The true position, I think, is that the successor is no more to be taken to have obtained ownership than the predecessor is to be assumed to have had it in the first place. The role of section 78(1) is to explain how property should be valued where it has passed from the predecessor to the successor without a sale. It is not to deem property to have passed or, more specifically, to deem the predecessor to have had ownership or the successor to have achieved it. The provision does not state that property is to be deemed to belong to the successor, and no such inference can be drawn from property's being treated "as if … it had been sold". Section 78(1) has a valuation function. It says nothing about whether section 24(1)(b) is satisfied." (Inmarsat Global Limited v. HMRC [2022] EWCA Civ 1076, Newey LJ)
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- Deeming provision can result in debt owed to oneself
"[46] Here, the statutory fiction of s49(1), interpreted in line with St Barbe Green, is that trust property, subject to trust liabilities, is beneficially held by the trust beneficiary, here, Mrs Pride. The purpose of the statutory fiction is plainly to bring the trust assets and liabilities into (in this case) Mrs Pride’s estate for inheritance tax purposes. The persons between whom the statutory fiction is to be resorted to, are plainly Mrs Pride (personally) and the trust in which she had a beneficial interest, namely the property trust. Thus, when another part of the Act - in this instance, s103 - asks whether Mrs Pride “incurred” the debt comprised in the trust liability in question, it seems to us it is an inevitable consequence of Mrs Pride’s deemed ‘holding’ of the liability, that she did ‘incur’ the debt; and that this is not an unjust, absurd or anomalous result. We acknowledge the slight oddity of Mrs Pride being deemed to have incurred the debt represented by the loan notes when, at the time the debt was created (back in 2002), Mrs Pride was herself the creditor; however, this is not in our view an unjust, absurd or anomalous result (in terms of its substantive effect on inheritance tax) - it just means that, had Mrs Pride not transferred the loan notes to the children’s trust, Mrs Pride’s estate would have had equal and offsetting assets and liabilities represented by the loan notes (subject, as provided for in s5(3), to any provision in the Act to the effect that the liability side of the loan notes was not to be taken into account)." (Pride v. HMRC [2023] UKFTT 316 (TC), Judge Citron)
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- Trust IIP holder not deemed to have incurred the trust debts themself
"[58]...(7) However, the difficulty faced by HMRC is that whilst we are satisfied that the guidance in Fowler would support an approach which means that the "logical world" provided for by s49(1) should be read across and applied to other statutory provisions where this reflects the inevitable consequences or corollaries of such a state of affairs, particularly where this assists with giving effect to the purpose of anti-avoidance provisions, and the result would not lead to absurdity, we do not agree with HMRC as regards the interpretation of s49(1) itself. We are not persuaded that the deeming in s49(1) requires that the holder of the interest in possession be treated as personally liable for the debts of the settlement. Viewing s49(1) in its statutory context, it is not necessary to impose such a construction on the language of the provision – the provision makes sense, and fulfils its statutory purpose, as interpreted by Mann J in St Barbe Green, in that it operates to bring the settled property into the estate of the holder of the interest in possession. The "notion of property from which liabilities have been notionally deducted" (at [12]) does not require that settlement liabilities are treated as being the liabilities of anyone other than, here, the Life Trustees. Section 49(1) should not be construed in a way which forces it to answer a different question, which is one which there is no evidence that Parliament had intended it should answer.
[59] We therefore conclude that the FTT made an error of law when it concluded that it is a necessary implication in the language of s49(1) that debts of the settlement should be treated as having been incurred by the holder of the interest in possession. It follows from this conclusion that the FTT's decision that such deeming should then be carried across when construing s103 involved an error of law." (Elborne v. HMRC [2025] UKUT 59 (TCC), Judges Zaman and Tilakapala)
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- CGT LLP deeming provisions do not apply for all CGT purposes
"[87(3)] ...Moreover, even if Sections 59 and 59A of the TCGA had included similar language to that described above in Section 863 of the ITTOIA, there is a second reason why we do not think that the combined effects of those sections would be sufficient to get the Respondents home. This is that the purpose of the provisions is to deem the stated matters to be the case for the purposes of determining the chargeable gains arising to the members of a limited liability partnership in respect of the disposal of the limited liability partnership's assets and the assessment of the members of the limited liability partnership to tax on those chargeable gains. It does not follow that the matters which have been deemed to be the case for those purposes should then be deemed to be the case in applying every other provision in the TCGA as a whole. A deeming provision applies only for the purposes for which it was enacted and its effects do not extend beyond those purposes...
[87(4)]...It does not follow that, because the assets of a limited liability partnership are deemed to be held by the members of that limited liability partnership for the purposes of determining the chargeable gains arising to those members in respect of the disposal of limited liability partnership's assets and the assessment of the members of the limited liability partnership to tax on those chargeable gains, a provision in the TCGA referring to the performance of investment management services in respect of a collective investment scheme should be applied on the basis that the assets of a limited liability partnership in which the collective investment scheme invested should be regarded as being the assets of the collective investment scheme." (Millican v. HMRC [2024] UKFTT 618 (TC), Judge Beare)
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- No CGT acquisition when bankrupt reacquires from trustee in bankruptcy
"[39] Although the provision, on its terms, is stated to apply only to the bankrupt's assets while those assets are held by the trustee in bankruptcy and therefore does not expressly deal with the position once the assets have re-vested in the bankrupt (or the disposal of the assets by the trustee in bankruptcy to the bankrupt and the corresponding acquisition of those assets by the bankrupt from the trustee in bankruptcy which that re-vesting entails), it is in our view a necessary implication from the terms of the provision that that re-vesting (and the disposal and re-acquisition which that re-vesting entails) should similarly be disregarded, and that the assets in question should be deemed always to have continued to be owned by the bankrupt for the purposes of the TCGA. After all, if they are to be treated for the purposes of the TCGA as if they have continued to be owned by the bankrupt throughout the period in which they are held by the trustee in bankruptcy, then they can hardly be the subject of a disposal by the trustee in bankruptcy to the bankrupt or the subject of an acquisition by the bankrupt from the trustee in bankruptcy after the end of the bankruptcy. It therefore goes without saying that there can be no disposal by the trustee in bankruptcy, or re-acquisition by the bankrupt, at that stage." (Newfield v. HMRC [2024] UKFTT 116 (TC), Judge Beare)
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- Notional company used to calculate partnership profits treated as having same ownership characteristics as real partnership
"[45] The next question is whether, on this basis, the related party provisions (and more particularly s835) are capable of extending to the notional company. In other words the issue between the parties is the extent to which, if at all, the elements which establish ownership or control of the partnership can be attributed to the ownership of the notional company. In agreement with HMRC, and for the reasons we explain, we do not regard the absence of specific words treating the notional company as having the ownership attributes of the relevant partnership to mean that those related party provisions are somehow incapable of applying.
[46] The extent of deeming will be commensurate to the statutory purpose. As discussed, that purpose is calculation of the profits. Calculation in this context is not simply an exercise of identifying the arithmetic process to be applied to given amounts, but may also include rules on what, or the extent to which, amounts are to be included within that process. Checking that the related party exception does not apply in order to know whether debits for amortisation of intangibles may be deducted is just as much part of the calculation as the subtraction of the amortised amount in order to derive the profits figure from which the appellants' profit shares can be derived." (Muller UK and Ireland Group LLP v. HMRC [2024] UKUT 273 (TCC), Trower J and Judge Raghavan)
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But characteristics not attributed to partners
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"[53] We do not consider that BCM UT helps the appellants' case given the particular issues involved. It was a case where the real corporate member was seeking to have an assumption attributed to itself by reference to the assumption the legislation required regarding the notional company (viz. that it was carrying on the trade of the partnership) in circumstances where the corporate member's challenge to the FTT's finding of fact that the corporate member was not carrying on any trade had failed. The current case concerns the converse situation, namely, to what extent are the real circumstances regarding ownership and control as they pertain to a real entity (LLP) to be attributed to the notional company? The Upper Tribunal's essential point was that the statutory assumption was only for calculating the corporate members' share of the partnership profits - it did not extend to provision against the corporate members' profits more generally. If it had been intended to do so, it would have been worded differently. In our view, the reasoning in BCM UT, insofar it is confirmed that any assumption or statutory fiction did not extend beyond calculation of the corporate member's profits, is in fact more consistent with HMRC's construction as to the scope of s1259. As the related party provisions are part and parcel of the calculation process, so too they fall within the purpose of the deeming." (Muller UK and Ireland Group LLP v. HMRC [2024] UKUT 273 (TCC), Trower J and Judge Raghavan)
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- Deeming for the purposes of the 'charge' to tax given more limited scope
"[95] However, I agree with Mr Bremner that as Mr Peacock submits the purpose of s279 is to apply the special rules and the special higher rates of tax to the IRF activities and it is this purpose which should be focussed upon. It specifically applies where a company carries on oil-related activities as part of a trade and it then carves those activities out as a separate trade for the application of the more limiting rules which follow and the higher rates of tax. To my mind, that is re-enforced by reference to the treatment as a separate trade being for the purposes of the "charge" to corporation tax on income as a separate trade. That focus on the charge to tax is then followed through in the subsequent provisions contained in ss279A, 279B and 279C CTA 2010. As Mr Bremner submitted the ring fence regime is in essence therefore concerned with the calculation of the charge to corporation tax.
[96] I agree with Mr Peacock that capital allowances form part of the calculation of the corporation tax charge, but when considering the interaction with Part 22 (where that interaction is not expressly stated in the legislation) the purpose of s279 must be set alongside the purpose of Part 22. Part 22 provides rules to allow restructuring within a group of companies such that a trade (or part thereof) can be moved from one group company to another without triggering capital allowance charges and preserving the continuity of losses and capital allowances.
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[116] There is no good reason why the interaction with the rules contained in s279 should have the result that the basic structure of the capital allowances code is side-stepped by interposing a subsidiary. I agree with the submission of Mr Bremner that this would be a perverse result. I consider that clear wording to achieve that result would be needed and no such wording has been identified. In Fowler terms the deeming effect of s279 would go too far and would produce "unjust, absurd or anomalous results". (I recognise that these contextual considerations are altered if the CATS Election is considered to have the effect of causing Amoco to have had an IRF and ORF trade prior to the Hive-down, but for reasons I explained later I have concluded that the CATS Election did not have such effect.) " (CATS North Sea Limited v. HMRC [2024] UKFTT 512 (TC), Judge Bowler)
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