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Procedure.Tax
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N1: Form and format of hearing
Hearing generally required (except in default paper cases)
“(1) Subject to rule 26(6) (determination of a Default Paper case without a hearing) and the following paragraphs in this rule, the Tribunal must hold a hearing before making a decision which disposes of proceedings, or a part of proceedings, unless--
(a) each party has consented to the matter being decided without a hearing; and
(b) the Tribunal considers that it is able to decide the matter without a hearing.” (FTT Rules, r.29(1)).​
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- No need for hearing to dispose of proceedings following withdrawal of taxpayer
“The Unless Directions recorded that a withdrawal notice “Normally … would conclude the proceedings without any further action by the Tribunal; however, as these are the lead cases under a Rule 18 Direction, I consider it is best to formalise the position by issuing a decision notice dismissing the appeals …”. [The taxpayer argued that the] 17 December 2013 Notice [dismissing the appeals] was the document issued to dismiss the appeals. Rule 29 required that a hearing be held before making a decision which disposes of proceedings, unless the parties consented to the matter being decided without a hearing, and the Tribunal considered it was able to decide the matter without a hearing. Neither Vaultdawn nor (so far as Vaultdawn was aware) Montpelier had consented to determination of the appeal without a hearing… We do not accept Ms Redston’s submission (see [50-51] above) that the Tribunal’s decision notice dated 17 December 2013 was invalid…Vaultdawn’s withdrawal disposed of the proceedings, and there was no need for any hearing.” (Vaultdawn Ltd v. HMRC [2015] UKFTT 383 (TC), §82).
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- FTT entitled to decide not to hold hearing due to practical difficulties
"[37] In the light of considering of Rule 2(2) (a)-(e), it is apparent that the submission that the FTT cannot take into account administrative and practical considerations when making its decision is not arguable. Even if one were to limit themselves to Rule 2(2)(c), the requirement is to ensure participation in the proceedings only extends “so far as practicable”. The use of “practicable” as opposed to a different word such as “possible” is an indication that administrative burdens, challenges and complexities fall within the ambit of the overriding objective of dealing with cases fairly and justly and can be taken into account as a relevant matter when deciding the form of the hearing. It was not the only the matter the FTT took into account - it also balanced and considered fairness as set out above. This was against the further background where the FTT was entitled to find that the Appellant had consented to a paper determination.
[38] The Applicant had stated he was unable to travel to the UK to attend a hearing in person. The parties were invited to make submissions on the form of the hearing in December 2024 and the Applicant stated, ‘I am happy to proceed with paperwork or some form of mobile connection, as we do not have a stable internet service in our area.’ He therefore did not request a telephone hearing but consented to a paper hearing while offering telephone as an alternative. The FTT was entitled to decide that a telephone hearing would not be just and fair (in accordance with the overriding objective) for the reasons it gave (including the length of the hearing and volume of papers). Furthermore, the FTT adopted a written procedure by which evidence could be tested by way of written questions and answers being given in respect of the witnesses’ evidence. This procedure was to provide a fair hearing in accordance with the principles of natural justice." (Mayet v. HMRC [2025] UKUT 377 (TCC), Judge Rupert Jones, PTA)
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- Procedure on the papers using written answers and questions for cross-examination
"[39] I am also satisfied that the Applicant was given a reasonable opportunity to attend a hearing in person or by video but declined it. The procedure adopted was just and fair. It was clear that the Applicant did not require a telephone hearing even if he raised the potential as an alternative. Most importantly, and in any event, he consented to a paper determination without a hearing. It was fair for the FTT to proceed on the papers without a telephone hearing for reasons it gave. The procedure was fair to both parties because the FTT had to decide the reliability and credibility of all witnesses and the weight to be given to their evidence based on written statements and written answers to the questions. This was the closest to cross examination that could be adopted without an oral hearing. The FTT made a case management decision that was rational and it took into account material matters when exercising its discretion." (Mayet v. HMRC [2025] UKUT 377 (TCC), Judge Rupert Jones, PTA)
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Form of hearing
“(3)…the Tribunal may by direction –
(g) decide the form of any hearing;” (FTT Rules, r.5(3)(g)).
Remote hearing
"[31] Mr Burgess was treated as making another application for postponement of the hearing, saying that he was unfairly being forced to have a video hearing;
[32] We refused this application for the following reasons.
[33] We had regard to the guidance in the Equal Treatment Bench Book, Appendix E dealing with remote hearings with particular consideration of the fact that Mr Burgess was effectively a litigant in person.
[34] In this case there was no reasonable expectation of when Mr Burgess could attend a hearing in person. Mr Burgess had said his mother needed support for six months in November 2020. Consequently the hearing was adjourned in November 2020 until a date after the period of six months to allow for that support. Now, eight months later, he was saying she needed support for a further two months. In addition, travel restrictions including the Covid “red list”, which imposed expensive hotel quarantine requirements for travel from South Africa, meant that as Mr Burgess acknowledged, he was unable to travel back to the UK without unacceptable costs. The use of the video platform hearing was therefore particularly appropriate in this case.
[35] The overriding objective set out in Rule 2 of the First-Tier Tribunal Procedural Rules must be given paramount consideration when deciding any application. Given the circumstances of Mr Burgess and the background to this case involving protracted litigation over many years we were satisfied that it was the interests of justice and fairness (which must consider the position of both parties to the litigation) to proceed as arranged by way of the video platform." (Tradestar International Limited v. HMRC [2022] UKFTT 8 (TC), Judge Bowler)
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Switching from video to in-person hearing
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Due to unreliable broadband
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"[5] The case was listed for a one day hearing by video to begin at 10am on 27 June 2022. Ms Bartram had previously confirmed in writing that she had “a reliable broadband connection and the ability to access the electronic bundle while simultaneously attending the hearing by video”.
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[10] Soon after those exchanges, Ms Bartram lost her internet connection to the hearing. There were several reconnection attempts, and she finally re-joined by phone. She told the Tribunal she lived in a remote part of the country with unreliable broadband and would prefer the hearing to be on a face-to-face basis. Taking into account in particular her connection difficulties, we decided to adjourn the hearing with directions." (ATN Marketing Limited v. HMRC [2023] UKFTT 30 (TC), Judge Redston)
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Timetable for hearing
“In view of the introduction of new evidence, however, I consider that it would be useful for the parties to agree a timetable to try to ensure that the submissions and evidence can be heard in three days. Accordingly, I direct that the parties should try to agree such a timetable appeal or should submit separate timetables to assist the Tribunal in managing the hearing.” (London Cellular Communications Ltd v. HMRC [2014] UKFTT 272 (TC), §26).
Recording the hearing
- Litigant in person refused permission to record video hearing
"[9] First, the Appellant made an oral application for permission to record the hearing in accordance with s.9 (1) (a) of the Contempt of Court Act 1981 ("the Recording Application.") The basis of his application was that as a litigant in person he would have difficulty taking notes. He contrasted himself with Mr Scott (the Respondents' representative) who was assisted by Mr Simpson. Specifically, the Appellant wanted to record his own voice. He informed us that if he used his iPad this would pick up his voice, but not the voices of others in the hearing. He also submitted that it would cost him £2,000.00 to obtain a transcript of the hearing. The Respondents adopted a neutral position on this application.
[10] We fully considered the Recording Application. Specifically, we considered the Appellant's position as a litigant in person. We noted that if this reason alone sufficed for the grant of permission then a very large number of litigants in hearings before the Tribunal would be able to make their own recordings. We noted that no reasons related to disability were advanced to support the Recording Application. We considered that the hearing was being recorded [3], via the Tribunal video service, and that the Appellant would be able to request a transcript of the hearing, if necessary. In all the circumstances and having considered Rule 2 of The Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Tax Chamber) Rules 2009 ("the Rules"), we refused the Recording Application. We explained to the Appellant that the hearing would be conducted at a pace (including pauses) that enabled him to take full notes. During the hearing, we checked with the Appellant that the pace was appropriate. He confirmed that it was. Also, we reminded the Appellant that he could request a transcript." (Wardle v. HMRC [2024] UKFTT 543 (TC), Judge Newstead Taylor)
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